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The degree to which this responsibility is based on stereotypes about the “good victim” has
been well documented in the context of sexual assault. This paper applies these insights to
the context of intimate partner criminal harassment. All available statistics suggest that
intimate partner criminal harassment is committed overwhelmingly by men against former
female intimate partners. This crime affects thousands of women annually and can have
devastating implications for their physical and mental health. Using criminal harassment
decisions over the past decade, this paper argues that the elements of the offence –
specifically the requirements that the accused cause the complainant to fear for her safety,
that this fear be reasonable, and that he intend to harass her – feed into the tendency
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promptly to police, fail to obtain a restraining order, fail to demonstrate their fear in
predictable ways, or fail to communicate to their harassers that the harassment is
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Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment Through a Lens of Responsibilization *
Feminist scholars have demonstrated the gendered nature of intimate violence, and the tendency
to put the responsibility on women to avoid both sexual and physical violence. The degree to
which this responsibility is based on stereotypes about the “good victim” has been well
documented in the context of sexual assault. This paper applies these insights to the context of
intimate partner criminal harassment. All available statistics suggest that intimate partner
criminal harassment is committed overwhelmingly by men against former female intimate
partners. This crime affects thousands of women annually and can have devastating
implications for their physical and mental health. Using criminal harassment decisions over the
past decade, this paper argues that the elements of the offence – specifically the requirements
that the accused cause the complainant to fear for her safety, that this fear be reasonable, and
that he intend to harass her – feed into the tendency towards responsibilization. Women are
disbelieved if they fail to report the harassment promptly to police, fail to obtain a restraining
order, fail to demonstrate their fear in predictable ways, or fail to communicate to their
harassers that the harassment is unwanted. The accused’s behaviour, by contrast, is never
subjected to a standard of reasonableness. After analyzing the case law on criminal harassment,
and reviewing the approach taken in other jurisdictions, the paper concludes that legislative
reform is a necessary step towards providing an adequate criminal justice response to this
serious problem.

INTRODUCTION
One of the primary contributions of feminist scholarship to criminal law has been to
establish the gendered nature of intimate partner violence.1 Intimate partner violence and sexual
assault, for example, are committed overwhelmingly by men against women. In this paper I
explore how intimate partner criminal harassment is also a gendered crime and how judicial
decisions reflect the same biases and assumptions that other gendered crimes reveal. Specifically,
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Lisa S Price, Feminist Frameworks: Building Theory on Violence against Women (Halifax, NS: Fernwood
Publishing, 2005) at 11.
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I will argue that, as with sexual assault, the law of criminal harassment has been influenced by
assumptions about how women should respond to male violence and how they are responsible
for changing their lives in order to avoid it. 2 This tendency to put responsibility on women to
avoid gendered violence has hindered effective law enforcement of these crimes. In the context
of criminal harassment, this tendency is facilitated both by the legislative requirements of
criminal harassment and the judicial interpretation thereof.
The Supreme Court of Canada has had many opportunities to deal with gendered crimes
in recent years and has fallen short.3 Emma Cunliffe has demonstrated, for example, that
equality is rarely given serious consideration in recent sexual assault cases in the Supreme
Court.4 With respect to sexual assault prosecutions more generally, women are often criticized
for their inadequate expressions of non-consent or for other behaviours which may have

2

I'm indebted to Lise Gotell whose groundbreaking work demonstrates how discourses of responsibilization and
risk management are prevalent in Canadian sexual assault decisions. See Lise Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative
Consent in Canadian Sexual Assault Law: Neoliberal Sexual Subjects and Risky Women” (2008) 41 Akron L Rev
865 [Gotell, “Rethinking Affirmative Consent”] and Lise Gotell "The Discursive Disappearance of Sexualized
Violence: Feminist Law Reform, Judicial Resistance and Neoliberal Sexual Citizenship" in Dorothy E Chunn, Susan
B Boyd and Hester Lessard eds, Reaction and Resistance: Feminism, Law and Social Change (Vancouver: UBC
Press, 2007) at 127-163 [Gotell, “The Discursive Disappearance”].
3
In R v JA, 2011 SCC 28, [2011] 2 SCR 440, while the outcome is consistent with gender equality, the analysis
takes a gender-neutral approach to sexual assault and fails to examine the context of intimate partner violence that
was so central to the case. See e.g. Janine Benedet, “Marital Rape, Polygamy, and Prostitution: Trading Sex Equality
for Agency and Choice?” (2013)18:2 Rev Const Stud 161 [Benedet, “Marital Rape”]. Similarly, in R v Hutchinson,
2014 SCC 19 the majority failed to consider the implications of its approach to statutory interpretation for
complainants with mental disabilities or other forms of incapacity to consent such as intoxication (see Criminal
Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1(2)(b) and (c)). The majority's approach also fails to see sexual assault as a
gendered phenomenon. For a discussion of how sexual assault has become degendered and detached from equality
see Gotell, "The Discursive Disappearance”, supra note 2. See also R v DAI, [2012] 1 SCR 149, 2012 SCC; R v
O’Brien, 2013 SCC 2, [2013] 1 SCR 7, (involving uttering threats in the context of an intimate partner relationship);
and R v Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 SCR 14, (involving the defence of duress for a woman who had been
repeatedly harassed by her ex-partner). In all of these decisions, the gendered nature of intimate partner violence
and sexual assault is missing from the Court's analysis.
4
Emma Cunliffe, “Sexual Assault Cases in the SCC: Losing Sight of Substantive Equality?” (2012) 57 Sup Ct L
Rev 295. Cunliffe argues that while equality has underpinned the development of the substantive definition of
consent as well as legislative reforms to improve trial procedure, individual complainants are still not fully protected
from myths and stereotypes in situations where consent and credibility are in issue. This is not due to the absence of
legal tools to address these problems but instead a result of the failure of judicial approaches to infuse equality
reasoning in trial and appellate decisions.	
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“encouraged” the violence against them.5 This paper demonstrates that the same phenomenon is
seen in criminal harassment cases. The very definition of the crime requires that the Crown
prove that the complainant, who, in intimate partner harassment, is almost always a woman, was
afraid for her safety or that of others and that her fear was reasonable in the circumstances. The
response of the victimized woman is scrutinized and may be found wanting, thus preventing
successful prosecution. Her life may be significantly disrupted by the harassment, she may have
to change much of her day-to-day routine, she may be unable to work because of the harassment,
but if she was not afraid for her safety in a way that is judged by others to be reasonable, the law
does not recognize the harassment. At no time is her harasser held to a standard of objectively
reasonable behaviour.
Section 264 of the Criminal Code sets out the definition of criminal harassment in
Canada:
No person shall, without lawful authority and knowing that another person is harassed
or recklessly as to whether the other person is harassed, engage in conduct referred to in
subsection (2) that causes that other person reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear
for their safety or the safety of anyone known to them.
The conduct mentioned in subsection (1) consists of
repeatedly following from place to place the other person or anyone known to them;
repeatedly communicating with, either directly or indirectly, the other person or anyone
known to them;
besetting or watching the dwelling-house, or place where the other person, or anyone
known to them, resides, works, carries on business or happens to be; or

5

In her article on the ethical responsibilities of defence counsel in sexual assault prosecutions, Elaine Craig
demonstrates that defence counsel still make use of stereotypes about women's sexuality in defending sexual assault
prosecutions. Elaine Craig, “The Ethical Obligations of Defence Counsel in Sexual Assault Cases” (2014) 51:2
Osgoode Hall LJ 427.
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engaging in threatening conduct directed at the other person or any member of their
family.6
The offence is a hybrid offence punishable by a maximum 10 years on indictment and six
months on summary conviction.7 This section was enacted in 1993 in response to a number of
murders of women by former intimate partners after a period of criminal harassment.8 Section
231(6) was also added to the Criminal Code in 1997 providing that murders which take place in
the course of criminal harassment are punished as first-degree.9
The first section of this paper presents a brief description of what we do know about
intimate partner criminal harassment in terms of its incidence, its impact on the women harassed
and the criminal justice response to this crime. This is followed by a summary of the theoretical
literature on the concept of “responsibilization” as informed by the work of feminists in the areas
of sexual assault and intimate partner violence. After setting out this context, the paper turns to
an analysis of the case law on intimate partner harassment, focusing on three elements of the
offence: the requirement that the complainant be afraid for her safety or the safety of others, the
requirement that the fear be reasonable and the requirement that the accused know that his
conduct is harassing. The focus of this paper is the judicial discourse around the elements of
criminal harassment and how this discourse perpetuates problematic assumptions about gendered
violence and women’s responsibility to avoid it.

Close window no don't 6 Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, ss 264(1)-(2).
7
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 264(3).
8
See Isabel Grant, Natasha Bone & Kathy Grant, “Canada’s Criminal Harassment Provisions: A Review of the First
Ten Years” (2003) 29 Queen’s LJ 175.
9
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 231(6).
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The Empirical Reality of Criminal Harassment
While a number of academic articles were written after s. 264 was enacted,10 criminal
harassment is under-studied and under-theorized in more recent legal and feminist literature in
Canada. However, there is significant social science and medical literature exploring criminal
harassment which reveals how dangerous and destructive former intimate partner harassment can
be for women.11
The extent of criminal harassment and its threat to women’s equality should not be
underestimated. Women experience criminal harassment in Canada at an alarming rate. In the
most recent Statistics Canada survey, for example, 3% of all women reported being harassed in
2009.12 In 2011, uttering threats and criminal harassment accounted for 20% of the violent crime
against women in Canada.13 In 2011, there were approximately 11,700 female victims of police-

10

Rosemary Cairns Way, “The Criminalization of Stalking: An Exercise in Media Manipulation and Political
Opportunism” (1994) 39 McGill LJ 379; Grant, Bone & Grant, supra note 8; Bruce MacFarlane, “People Who Stalk
People” (1997) 31 UBCL Rev 37; Diane Crocker, “Criminalizing Harassment in the Transformative Potential of
Law” (2008) 20:1 CJWL 87.
11
See, e.g. Kimberly N Fleming, et al, “Intimate Partner Stalking Victimization and Posttraumatic Stress Symptoms
in Post-Abuse Women” (2012) 18:12 Violence Against Women 1368; Maria A Pico-Alfonso, et al, “The impact of
physical, psychological, and sexual intimate male partner violence on women's mental health: depressive symptoms,
posttraumatic stress disorder, state anxiety, and suicide” (2006) 15:5 Journal Of Women's Health 599; Canada,
Department of Justice, Research and Statistics Division, Health Impacts of Violent Victimization on Women and
their Children by Nadine Wathen (Ottawa: Department of Justice, 2012) at 10-11; World Health Organization,
Global and regional estimates of violence against women: prevalence and health effects of intimate partner violence
and non-partner sexual violence (Italy: World Health Organization, 2013) at 21-26; Laura E Watkins, et al, “The
longitudinal impact of intimate partner aggression and relationship status on women’s physical health and
depression symptoms” (2014) 28:5 Journal of Family Psychology 655; Emily Finch, "Stalking: A Violent Crime or
a Crime of Violence?” (2002) 41:5 Howard Journal of Criminal Justice 422 [Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime”];
Frank R Farnham, David V James &Paul Cantrell, “Association between violence, psychosis, and relationship to
victim and stalkers” (2000) 355 The Lancet 199; David V James and Frank R Farnham, “Stalking and Serious
Violence” (2004) 31 Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online 432; Michele Pathé,
Rachel Mackenzie & Paul Mullen, “Stalking by law: damaging victims and rewarding offenders” (2004) 12 JLM
103 at 106 [Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen]; Leila Dutton and Barbara Winstead, “Types, Frequency, and
Effectiveness of Responses to Unwanted Pursuit and Stalking” (2011) 26:6 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1129
[Dutton & Winstead].
12
Statistics Canada, Juristat, Measuring Violence against Women: Statistical Trends by Sinha Maire (Ottawa:
StatCan, 2013) (Catalogue no 85-002-X) at 33 [Statistics Canada, 2013].
13
Ibid at 8. According to this recent Statistics Canada report, “The five most common violent offences committed
against women were common assault (49%), uttering threats (13%), serious assault (10%), sexual assault level I
(7%), and criminal harassment (7%)” at 11.
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reported criminal harassment, which constituted more than 75% of all criminal harassment
complaints to police.14 Eighty-five percent of the perpetrators in 2011 incidents against women
were men. Intimate partners accounted for 58% of all criminal harassment of women. Strangers
accounted for only 8% of criminal harassment.15 Thirty-nine women have been murdered after
being criminally harassed in the past decade, including three women who were killed in 2011.16
Studies also suggest that a large number of women who have been criminally harassed by
a former partner have also been assaulted or sexually assaulted by him.17 While criminal
harassment does not necessarily involve further physical violence, intimate partner criminal
harassment is more likely to escalate to assault or even femicide than other forms of criminal
harassment.18 Intimate partner criminal harassment is also likely to last up to twice as long on
average as other forms of criminal harassment.19 Intimate partner criminal harassers are less
likely to have a serious mental illness than those who harass strangers.20 When it comes to
criminal harassment, women are at greatest risk of escalating violence from non-mentally ill,
former intimate partners.21
Intimate partner criminal harassment is often only one component of a constellation of
behaviours, such as assault and threatening, all of which together form part of the male partner’s
14

Ibid at 32.
Ibid.
16
Ibid at 33. In the United States, McFarlane et al. studied intimate partner femicides in 10 cities and found that
76% of victims had been “stalked” in the 12 months prior to the killing. J McFarlane, JC Campbell, S Wilt, CJ
Sachs, Y Ulrich & X Xu, “Stalking in intimate partner femicide” (1999) 3:4 Homicide Studies 300.
17
Carol Jordan, TK Logan, Robert Walker & Amy Nigoff, “Stalking: an Examination of the Criminal Justice
Response” (2003) 18 J Interpersonal Violence 148 at 149.
18
Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11. This study found that 70% of the sample of intimate partner
harassments involved serious physical violence whereas only 27% of the stranger/acquaintance sample did. James
and Farnham, “Stalking and Serious Violence”, supra note 11; Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11.
19
Evan Stark, Coercive Control: The Entrapment of Women in Personal Life (UK: Oxford University Press, 2007)
at 256 [Stark, “Coercive Control”]. See also: T Goldsworthy & M Raj, “Stopping the stalker: Victim responses to
stalking” (2014) 2:1 Griffith Journal of Law & Human Dignity 171.
20
Farnham, James & Cantrell, supra note 11 at 199.
21
Ibid.
15
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assertion of control over his (former) partner .22 Evan Stark describes “stalking” as the most
common behavioural component of coercive control next to assault.23 As such, intimate partner
criminal harassment can be seen as a variant of intimate partner violence which reflects the
ongoing inequality of women in intimate relationships.24 As Rosemary Cairns Way has pointed
out:
Stalking is one vicious manifestation of a broader spectrum of violence against women,
one part of a multifaceted whole, intricately linked to the systemic social, economic and
political inequalities experienced daily by Canadian women. The statistics detailing the
extent of violence against women in Canada provide horrifying evidence of the “brutal
face of inequality.”25
Criminal harassment is an extremely traumatic experience that often continues for a
significant period of time. Women respond in different ways to this kind of ongoing stress in
their lives. For some women, the harm resulting from harassment “is severe and long-lasting;
the adverse consequences caused by victimization frequently outlive the duration of the
harassment”.26 Finch cites English studies that suggest that from 71%-94% of those subjected to
harassment undergo major lifestyle and personality changes which often outlast the harassment.27
Sleep and appetite disturbances are common.28 Complainants are likely to become paranoid,
anxious, introverted and less trustful generally, not just with respect to the harasser. Social
isolation and a sense of powerlessness commonly ensue and there is a high risk of depressive

22

Isabel Grant & Joanna Birenbaum, “Taking Threats Seriously: Section 264.1 and Threats as a form of Domestic
Violence” (2012) 59 Crim LQ 206.
23
Stark, “Coercive Control”, supra note 19 at 256.
24
See, for example, Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 149 stating that “stalking is but one variant of intimate violence”.
Feminist scholars have debated the meaning and definition of violence and whether it requires actual force before
behaviour can be labelled violent. See Price, supra note 1 at 11-23. See also Grant & Birenbaum, supra note 22 for
an argument that uttering threats is a form of intimate partner violence. Statistics Canada describes criminal
harassment as a violent crime. See Statistics Canada, 2013, supra note 12.
25
Cairns Way, supra note 10 at 382.
26
Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime”, supra note 11 at 424.
27
Ibid.
28
Dutton & Winstead, supra note 11 at 1131.
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symptoms, including self-harm.29 The General Social Survey found that female complainants
were more likely than their male counterparts to stop going out alone and to socialize less after
experiencing criminal harassment.30
Criminal justice responses to intimate partner harassment have been found to be wanting.
In a majority of police complaints, charges are never laid. Many charges are dropped without
proceeding, or dropped in exchange for the accused entering into a peace bond. In an early
review of charges under s. 264, for example, it was found that 58% of charges were stayed or
withdrawn before trial and, of those charges that proceeded, only about 35% were convicted.31 In
the large American National Violence against Women Survey in 2000, for every 100 female
stalking victims identified “52 reported the crimes to the police, 13 men were prosecuted, 7 were
convicted, and 4 went to jail.” 32 It is no surprise that victims of criminal harassment demonstrate
a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system which leads to even lower rates of reporting.33
As with sexual assault, the complainant’s credibility may be found to be lacking possibly
because she has had ongoing contact with the accused or because she is distraught and upset
when she reports the harassment to police.34 In some cases the complainant actually returns to
her former partner as a means of ending the harassment which undermines her credibility further
29

Finch, “Stalking: A Violent Crime”, supra note 11 at 425.
Statistics Canada, Juristat, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile 2005 by Kathy Aucoin, ed (Ottawa:
StatCan, 2005) (Catalogue no 85-224-XIE) [Statistics Canada, 2005].
31
Department of Justice Canada, A Review of Section 264 (Criminal Harassment) of the Criminal Code of Canada
by Richard Gill and Joan Brockman (Ottawa: DOJ, October 1996) at vii, online: Department of Justice <
http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/rp-pr/cj-jp/fv-vf/wd96_7-dt96_7/wd96_7.pdf>.
In the United States context, more recently, Jordan et al, supra note 17 at 159, found that 54% of felony charges of
criminal harassment and 62% of misdemeanour charges were dropped without proceeding to trial.
32
Stark, “Coercive Control”, supra note 19 at 256.
33
Justice Unions' Parliamentary Group, Independent Parliamentary Inquiry into Stalking Law Reform: Main
Findings and Recommendations, February 2012, www.protectionagainststalking.org/inquiryreportfinal.pdf, at 8 and
11. The inquiry cites a study presented to them in which 72% of complainants reported being unhappy with the
criminal justice response to the harassment while 65% reported being unhappy with the police response.
Complainants reported that their complaints to police were not investigated thoroughly even though reports were
usually not made to police until after a significant number of incidents.
34
Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 107.
30
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with the police.35 Police may see the matter as “merely” a domestic dispute that should be
resolved privately, particularly where the isolated acts of the harasser are not in themselves
individually threatening or physically violent.
Peace bonds and restraining orders are often resorted to in criminal harassment cases but
they often fail to stop the harassment and can be counterproductive in some cases.36
Protection orders provide dubious benefits for the victim but for stalkers unassailable
opportunities to further their harassment. As noted earlier, stalkers may petition the
court for a protection order against the victim, alleging that person is, in fact, stalking
them. [Intimate partner] stalkers are more disposed than other groups to duplicitous
behaviour of this type. Protection order hearings enforce contact between stalker and
victim, imposing a relationship that is both gratifying to the stalker and distressing to
the victim. They indulge the stalker’s quest for personal information about the victim
and endow the stalker with an audience to the litany of abuses he or she claims to have
suffered.37
Potentially vexatious family law proceedings are another mechanism by which perpetrators can
disrupt the lives of complainants.38 Perpetrators become quite skilled at learning how to
manipulate the limits of the criminal justice system by finding ways to harass which do not
violate the terms of the legislation.39

35

Ibid. For example, in a particularly tragic case R v VanEindhoven (2013) 9 CR (7th) 94 (Nun CJ), the victim left a
violent relationship and only returned after repeated phone calls from the accused threatening to kill himself. On her
return she was savagely beaten and stabbed to death.
36
Concern has been raised in British Columbia recently regarding a number of killings of women by intimate
partners who were under restraining orders. Andrea Woo & Justine Hunter, “Deaths show BC is failing victims of
domestic violence, watchdog charges”, Globe and Mail (13 May 2014) online: Globe and Mail <
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/british-columbia/spate-of-deaths-revives-criticism-of-bcs-domesticviolence-program/article18631650/>.
37
Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 108.
38
Fiona Kelly, “Producing Paternity: The Role of Legal Fatherhood in Maintaining the Traditional Family” (2009)
21 Can J Women & L 315 at 333 described how courts continue to award access to fathers who are abusive to the
mother. See also Marisa L Beeble, Deborah Bybee & Cris M Sullivan, “Abusive Men's Use of Children to Control
Their Partners and Ex-Partners” (2007) 12:1 European Psychologist 54 which described how abusive men use their
children as a means of controlling their intimate partners. See also the Justice Unions' Parliamentary Group, supra
note 33 at 20 which recommended that the courts be given the authority to suspend the parental responsibilities of
those who have been convicted of stalking who use vexatious applications for contact with children to get at the
complainant (Recommendation 21) and the ability to impose civil orders preventing further applications in Family
Court (Recommendation 23).
39
Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 104.
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Having demonstrated the seriousness of intimate partner criminal harassment, the paper
now turns to a brief review of the theoretical literature on “responsibilization” and to how
feminist insights in the context of sexual assault and intimate partner violence have informed our
understanding of gendered violence. It is against this framework that the judicial discourse on
intimate partner criminal harassment will be examined.
The Responsibilization of Gendered Violence against Women
As observed in the criminology literature, the shift towards neoliberal economies has had
an impact on governmental approaches to crime.40 In the context of crime prevention,
“[n]eoliberalism valorizes the individual as the rational manager of his or her own risk
portfolio”.41 According to David Garland, citizens in neoliberal societies have accepted “the
premise that crime is a normal, commonplace, aspect of modern society” and that governments
have limited ability to prevent or control it.42 Crime becomes understood as a risk to be
calculated, and crime prevention strategies turn to “the conduct of potential victims, to
vulnerable situations, and to those routines of everyday life which create criminal
opportunities”.43 These neoliberal strategies have served to transform our understanding of the
model citizen, who is now deemed the responsible and self-reliant individual whose reduced

40

David Garland, “The Limits of the Sovereign State: Strategies of Crime Control in Contemporary Society” (1996)
36 Brit J Crim 445 [Garland, “Limits of the Sovereign State”]; David Garland, “‘Governmentality’ and the Problem
of Crime: Foucault, criminology and sociology” (1997) 1 Theor Criminol 173 [Garland, “‘Governmentality’ and the
Problem of Crime”]; Kevin Haggerty, “From Risk to Precaution: The Rationalities of Personal Crime Prevention” in
Richard Ericson & Aaron Doyle, eds, Risk and Morality (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 193; Susan
Ilcan, “Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government” (2009) Canadian
Sociological Association 207; O’Malley, “Risk and Responsibility” in Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne & Nikolas
Rose, eds, Foucault and Political Reason: liberalism, neoliberalism, and rationalities of government (London: UCL
Press, 1996) 189.
41
Haggerty, supra note 40 at 193.
42
Garland, “Limits of the Sovereign State”, supra note 40 at 450.
43
Ibid at 451.
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expectations of the state mean he or she does not make claims on that state.44 This idea that
people are responsible for managing the risk they face on a day-to-day basis is referred to in this
paper as “responsibilization”.
While responsibilization is a relatively new discourse in criminology, blaming women for
the violence that is perpetrated against them is hardly a recent phenomenon. Rather, it can be
seen as a return to placing responsibility on women for their own safety. As Leslie Moran has
aptly put it: “For women and non-heterosexuals who have long been denied State provision of
safety and security, the rise of individual and private safety strategies is not so much a new
development within the politics of crime control and thereby their social inclusion, but a long
established feature of their social exclusion.”45 Elizabeth Stanko notes that, in terms of personal
violence, this positioning in relation to danger is “socially embedded within wider structures of
age, class, race/ethnicity, sexuality, masculinities and patriarchy…especially when negotiating
physical and sexual safety with men.”46 Any understanding of responsibilization in the context of
intimate violence against women must, therefore, also be informed by feminist insights into
particular vulnerabilities to intimate violence that arise as a result of power imbalances based on
gender. In that vein, feminist scholars have examined recent neoliberal value shifts and the rise

44

Janine Brodie, Politics on the Margins: Restructuring and the Canadian Women’s Movement (Halifax: Fernwood,
1995) quoted in J Koshan & W Wiegers, “Theorizing civil domestic violence legislation in the context of
restructuring: A tale of two provinces” (2007) 19 CJWL 145 at 157. See also Wendy Brown, Edgework: Critical
Essays on Knowledge and Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005) at 42, where she argues that
neoliberalism equates moral responsibility with rational action and “in so doing, it carries responsibility for the self
to new heights: the rationally calculating individual bears full responsibility for the consequences of his or her action
no matter how severe the constraints on this action…”
45
Leslie J Moran, “Affairs of the Heart: Hate Crime and the Politics of Crime Control” (2001) 12 Law and Critique
331 at 337.
46
Elizabeth Stanko “Safety Talk: Conceptualizing Women's Risk Assessment As a 'Technology of the Soul'” (1997)
1 Theor Criminol 479 at 483.
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of responsibilization as it relates to women in the context of sexual assault and intimate partner
violence.47
In no context is the tendency towards responsibilization more pervasive than in dealing
with sexual assault. Feminist scholars have documented the tendency in the sexual assault
context both to blame women for the sexual violence they experience and to hold women
responsible for avoiding sexual assault through proper avoidance activities.48 Blaming women
for sexual violence has a long history and manifests itself in numerous ways from how the
complainant was dressed, 49 her past choices of sexual partners, 50 or her mental health history.51
The responsibility for preventing sexual assault is only a slightly more subtle form of victim

47

Outside of the criminal law context, US case law on sexual harassment under title VII of the Civil Rights Act (42
USC § 2000e-2 (1991)) shows a similar trend towards blaming the victim of harassment through its requirement of
unwelcomeness whereby the plaintiff must show that the sexual harassment she experienced was not welcome. The
US Supreme Court has indicated that the plaintiff's speech and how she dresses in the workplace are relevant in the
assessment of unwelcomeness. See Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson 477 US 57 (1986). See Ann C Juliano, “Did
She Ask for It?: The “Unwelcome” Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases” (1991-192) 77 Cornell L Rev 1558
at 1586 "Dress is not the only element courts consider when deciding "welcomeness". The victim's personality must
be pristine enough to demonstrate that she did not invite the harassment. When courts engage in this inquiry, the
plaintiff's personality is put on trial." See also: Christina A Bull, “The Implications of Admitting Evidence of a
Sexual Harassment Plaintiff’s Speech and Dress in the Aftermath of Meritor Savings Bank v Vinson” (1994) 41
UCLA l Rev 117; Sandi Farrell, “Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of
Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence” (2003) 92 Ky LJ 483; Grace S Ho, “Note Quite Rights: How the
Unwelcomeness Elements in Sexual Harassment Law Undermines Title VII’s Transformative Potential” (2008) 20
Yale JL & Feminism 131; Wendy Pollack, “Sexual Harassment: Women’s Experience vs. Legal Definitions” (1990)
13 Harvard Women’s LJ 35.
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blaming: women are acknowledged as potential victims but are responsible for taking steps to
avoid that victimization. As Lise Gotell has aptly explained, “within the neoliberal regime of
responsibility, populations are divided on the basis of their capacity for self-management; those
women who can be represented as failing to adhere to the rules of sexual safekeeping are in turn
blamed for the violence they experience”.52 Victim blaming makes sexual assault an
individualized phenomenon which depends largely on the behaviour of the complainant. Victim
blaming, moves away from the notion of public responsibility for social issues such as violence
against women and instead supports a “decontextualized, de-gendered focus on ‘problematic’
individuals.”53 This leads to what Randall refers to as “disappearing perpetrators” where, rather
than focusing on the perpetrator himself and the social, political and economic contexts that
perpetuate male violence against women, attention is focused on the individual victim.54 Women
are divided into good and bad victims: those deserving of a legal response to violence against
them and those who are thus perceived as “unrapeable” such as women with mental disabilities
55

or women involved in prostitution.56 Racialized and other marginalized women feel this

burden disproportionately and are, in turn, deemed less valuable and less credible when their
safety efforts fail; they are thus more likely to be stigmatized as “bad” or “undeserving”
victims.57
Lise Gotell has described the tendency towards risk management and sexual safekeeping
in response to sexual assault as the primary governmental technology for responding to sexual
52
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assault. Sexual assault becomes “something that individual women should try to avoid”.58 The
ideal victim is constituted as “the rape-preventing subject who exercises appropriate caution (yet
fails).”59 As Gotell notes “(t)he new “ideal” and valorized victim is a responsible, security
conscious, crime preventing subject who acts to minimize her own sexual risk.”60
Women and girls from a young age are taught to negotiate their physical and sexual
safety.61 Avoiding victimization at the hands of men has become has become a regularized part
of many women’s daily routine.62 Teaching girls and young women to avoid the ever-present
risk of male violence has become so normalized that it is rarely questioned. Women and girls are
expected to avoid alcohol, to vigorously guard their drinks to avoid being drugged, not to dress
“provocatively”, not to walk home at night alone and never to leave an event with a stranger.63
Virtually all of these precautions, of course, falsely assume that women are more in danger from
strangers than from people they know.
Historically, the tendency to view male violence against women in intimate relationships
as a private matter between the partners has greatly hindered law enforcement approaches to
intimate partner violence.64 More recently, criminologists have documented the trend towards
putting the responsibility for avoiding intimate partner violence on the victim and her family
58
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members.65 Silverstein and Spark explore how programs for battered women focus on having
women “increasingly take full responsibility for their well-being even as governments take less
and less responsibility for making social change affecting their situation.”66 As a result, they
argue, some programs for battered women present ultimatums to powerless women about how
they have to live their lives in the same way that batterers present ultimatums to their female
victims.67 Victims of intimate partner violence are expected to develop safety plans which give
them strategies for avoiding or escaping from the abuser.68 As Hoyle notes, “victims are made
individually accountable – in part, at least – for minimizing the risk of future violence”69 by
developing and sticking with their safety plan. Such strategies may be useful in a context where
there is no relationship between a perpetrator and victim but they become much more complex
when dealing with women who have had an intimate relationship with the abuser, particularly
where ongoing access to children is involved. 70
These insights about responsibilization, as informed by a gendered analysis, are useful for
examining criminal harassment prosecutions and specifically the requirements in s. 264 that the
Crown prove the complainant was afraid for her safety or the safety of others, that her fear was
reasonable and that the accused knew or was reckless with respect to the fact that she was
harassed. While the treatment of female complainants in the criminal harassment context may
65
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not be as dire a situation as we have seen in the context of sexual assault over the past several
decades, there are worrisome similarities. For example, women are doubted if there is an
absence of physical violence or threats thereof.71 There is a tendency to attribute to women
ulterior motives for bringing claims of criminal harassment, for example, to obtain an advantage
in legal proceedings,72 which reproduces the tendency in sexual assault law to believe that
women bring claims falsely, contact police and assert fear where they in fact have none. As with
sexual assault, a woman’s motives are more likely to be doubted if she has a previous intimate
relationship with her harasser.73 Most notably, there is an expectation that women are responsible
for avoiding criminal harassment and thus must respond to harassment in particular ways if they
want the criminal justice system to acknowledge the crime. Police and other agencies often tell
women complaining of harassment to change their lives to minimize risk.74 A complainant is
told not to frequent locations where the potential accused might be, to change her route to and
from work or home, to change her phone number or not to take his calls, to install an alarm
system and, in extreme cases, to leave the jurisdiction.75 It is up to the responsible complainant to
block attempts at harassment even if that requires that she seriously curtail her daily activities
and mobility.76 Sometimes women are faced with contradictory messages: on the one hand do
not communicate with the accused under any circumstances. On the other hand, make sure you
communicate to him that you are harassed. If she fails, or chooses not to take such steps, no
71
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matter what her reasons, the seriousness and the very legitimacy of the harassment allegation
may be questioned.77
One of the problems with this responsibilization is that it creates the illusion that whether
criminal harassment ceases or escalates depends upon the behaviour of the complainant and is
not within the control of the accused. In fact, very little evidence supports the suggestion that the
complainant’s behaviour can have a significant impact on harassment. In some cases a particular
intervention makes things better, in other cases the same intervention makes things worse, while
in other cases it makes no difference whatsoever.78 Responsibilization allows the role of the
perpetrator, and the state, in stopping the harassment to be obscured.79
THE CASES:
An Overview
This study began with 348 trial and appellate decisions available on Quicklaw over the
past 10 years dealing with liability for criminal harassment (often along with other offences) or
sentencing for accused persons who pled guilty or were found guilty of criminal harassment at
77
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trial.80 Because this paper is focused on intimate partner criminal harassment, the cases were
separated into two groups. The first group includes all cases where a complainant had had an
intimate relationship with the accused. This term is defined broadly to include spouses, common
law and dating relationships. This group also includes cases in which the harassment arose out
of an intimate relationship, even if other people were involved (for example, where the accused
harassed both his former intimate partner and her new partner). 199 or 57% of the cases were
classified as intimate partner cases, all but one of which involved heterosexual relationships.
The second group of 101 cases (29%) were cases in which the relationship between the accused
and complainant was not one of current or former intimate partnership. There were a further
48(14%) cases, where it was not possible to determine the relationship between the parties and
these cases were eliminated.
While there is no way to determine whether these cases constitute a representative sample
of criminal harassment cases, these findings are remarkably consistent with larger government
studies on criminal harassment.81 In the overall sample, 93% of accused were men and 81% of
complainants were women. However the gender breakdown was more distinct in the intimate
partner cases, 96% of the accused being men (as compared to 87% in the non-intimate partner
group). Ninety-two percent of complainants in intimate partner cases were women as compared
to 68% of complainants in the non-intimate partner cases. These findings support the suggestion
80
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that intimate partner criminal harassment, in particular, is a highly gendered crime which is
predominantly committed by men against women.
The overall conviction rate across all cases was approximately 71%. The conviction rate
was slightly higher in the non-intimate partner group (72.3 %) as compared to the intimate
partner group (69.8%).82 When the conviction rate was broken down by gender and relationship,
male intimate partner accused were more likely to be convicted than female intimate partner
accused (70.2% v. 62.5%). In the non-intimate partner group, the opposite trend was evident –
women were more likely to be convicted (76.9% versus 71.6% for men). In both groups the
number of female accused was so small that it is difficult to draw any conclusions from the
differences in conviction rate by gender.
In almost 1/3 of the intimate partner cases, the accused was on a peace bond or a
restraining order at the time the criminal harassment took place, highlighting the lack of
effectiveness of such orders. In intimate partner cases where the accused had some sort of no
contact order with respect to the complainant, the conviction rate of almost 86% was
significantly higher. This pattern was even more striking for women accused where 100% of
those under some form of no contact order were convicted, although again the numbers are very
small, with only four women under pre-existing no contact orders.
In the vast majority of intimate partner cases the accused harasses someone of the
opposite sex. One case involved a same-sex intimate partner criminal harassment, where the
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accused harassed his former male partner.83 In the other eight intimate partner cases involving
accused and complainants of the same gender (six male accused and two female accused), the
harassment is directed at the new partner of the former intimate partner who is being harassed. 84
In every case where harassment is directed at a new partner, the former intimate partner is also a
complainant.
Looking at reported decisions, of course, does not give one a complete picture of criminal
harassment cases in Canada. In a majority of cases, charges are probably never laid. Many
charges are dropped, or dropped in exchange for the accused entering into a no contact order.
Many charges of criminal harassment that do proceed are resolved by guilty pleas.85 In some
cases, behaviour that could be considered criminal harassment may be charged as assault,
uttering threats or some other crime and thus will not have been identified as a criminal
harassment case. Nonetheless, the present sample does give one an indication of how judges are
dealing with the cases that do get to trial and the attitudes that inform those decisions. As such,
the case analysis in this paper is more a study of judicial attitudes towards intimate partner
criminal harassment than of the phenomenon of criminal harassment itself.
As Lise Gotell has demonstrated in the context of sexual assault, judicial discourses are
an important site for the reconstruction of normative heterosexuality and sexual citizenship.86
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Thus, “scrutinizing judicial discourses reveals both the shifting terms upon which the ‘good
victim’ is defined and a changing set of justifications for disqualifying claims of sexual
violence.”87 In the context of criminal harassment, these discourses both shape and reflect how
the “responsible victim” of criminal harassment is constructed. 88 The power of judicial
discourses can also act to silence the women who encounter the law.89 This is especially true of
those women who do not comply with the construction of the “responsible victim”. Such
decisions signal to men that they are not criminally responsible for instilling fear if, for example,
there ex-partner occasionally agrees to see them or responds to their texts or communications.
Such discourses may also affect women's choices, either in how they respond to the harassment
or whether they report it, potentially exposing them to greater danger.
The central claim of this paper is that the elements of criminal harassment as defined in s.
264, specifically the requirements that the complainant be reasonably fearful and that the accused
know that he is harassing her, lead judges to put the onus on women to prevent intimate partner
criminal harassment and to behave like proper victims. Other aspects of criminal harassment
under s. 264 may also create barriers to prosecution, such as the requirement that harassing
behaviour take place repeatedly.90 I focus, however, on the fear requirement and the mens rea
requirement because it is in these elements that problematic assumptions about how women
should respond to harassment arise most often. Because the focus is on the elements of the
offence, trial and appellate decisions were generally more useful than sentencing decisions.
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An initial objective of this study was to compare the judicial responses to male accused
and female accused in intimate partner criminal harassment cases. However, it is extremely
difficult to draw any conclusions from the female accused cases. There are only eight women
accused of intimate partner harassment in the database. Five of those eight decisions are
sentencing decisions in which the elements of the offence, such as reasonable fear and mens rea,
have already been established beyond a reasonable doubt.91 The three trial decisions all resulted
in acquittals.92 In one of these cases, R v Blohm,93 the charge appeared to be unsubstantiated.
The trial judge found that none of the elements of the actus reus could be made out as the
accused had not engaged in any of the enumerated harassing conduct or caused fear. The male
complainant had locked the accused out of her home (and denied her access to her possessions)
when she was away visiting her grandchildren, forcing her to stay in a shelter on her return.
There was no evidence that she had harassed the female complainant (the new girlfriend) nor that
she had come to the house knowing that the female complainant would be there.
The other two cases involved women seeking access to their children who were involved
in custody disputes with their male partners. In Harper,94 the accused was convicted of a
number of charges relating to mischief and obstructing the police but acquitted of criminal
harassment because the level of distress caused to her husband when she drove by his house and
made obscene gestures was insufficient. There was no discussion of the details of the husband’s
response to the harassment, nor of whether he responded reasonably. In KAM,95 the accused had
been trying to establish contact with her children whom she had not seen for eight months. The
91
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trial judge believed that her only purpose in repeatedly leaving messages for the complainant was
to contact her children through her former spouse. Overall, there were not enough cases from
which to draw general conclusions. While there may be other stereotypes about men responding
to female violence, I was unable to find evidence of the discourse of responsibilization in the
cases dealing with the elements of the offence.96 There is no equivalent conception of how a
reasonable man responds to harassment by a female former partner.
In the sections that follow, therefore, I focus on male intimate partner harassment of
women and examine the elements of criminal harassment that tend to put the onus on women to
respond in particular ways and feed this tendency towards responsibilization. I turn first to the
requirements that the woman be afraid and that her fear be reasonable, and then move on to
examine the accused’s mens rea with respect the fact that the complainant was harassed. In each
of these elements, there are numerous examples of judges expecting women to behave in
particular ways, which either illustrate societal expectations of a frightened woman or place the
responsibility on her to make sure the accused knows that he is harassing her. Evidence of this
trend is not found in every case, nor necessarily even in a majority of all cases but, as the
following cases will demonstrate, it is present often enough to raise concerns about the elements
of criminal harassment and the judicial interpretation thereof. One can only speculate about the
number of charges that were not laid or which never proceeded to trial based on similar logic on
the part of the police and prosecutors, and about the number of women who are deterred
altogether from going to police because they know they will not be construed as an ideal victim.
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An Analysis of the Intimate Partner Criminal Harassment Cases: the Judicial Discourse of
Responsibilization
1. Reasonable Fear for One’s Safety or the Safety of Others
Section 264(1) requires that the Crown prove that the accused caused the complainant
“reasonably, in all the circumstances, to fear for [her] safety or the safety of anyone known to
[her].”97 This requirement has both a subjective component, which asks whether the
complainant actually felt afraid for her safety, and an objective component, which asks whether
that fear was reasonable “in all the circumstances”. The requirement that the complainant be
afraid means that women will have to testify about their fear and be subject to cross-examination
regarding its honesty and its reasonableness. Where the accused is unrepresented by counsel, he
will likely conduct that cross-examination himself.98 The reasonable fear requirement may also
open up the possibility for challenges to the complainant’s character and mental health history, in
turn creating the potential for further abuse by the accused.99
While most judges recognize, at least in theory, that the well-established judicial
interpretation of “safety” includes psychological or emotional safety as well as physical safety,100
the threshold for psychological safety established in the case law is extremely high and
inevitably involves difficult line drawing.101 For example, it is not uncommon for judges to state
that it is insufficient if the complainant is “vexed, disquieted or annoyed”; rather she must be
97

Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 264(1).
Grant & Birenbaum, supra note 22. This problem has been acknowledged in the sexual assault context. Section
486.3(1) enables the Crown to apply to prevent an accused cross-examining a complainant under 18 years of age and
sub (2) allows the judge to order that the accused shall not personally cross-examine any witness it would impede
obtaining a full and candid account of her evidence. The judge should consider her age, whether she has a disability,
the nature of the offence and the nature of the relationship between the witness and the accused (s. 486.1 (3)).
99
Pathé, Mackenzie & Mullen, supra note 11 at 105. There were no cases in this sample where the record was clear
that an application had been made for access to psychiatric records of the complainant.
100
See, e.g.: R v Goodwin, (1997) 89 BCAC 269 (BCCA); R v Vandoodeward, [2009] OJ No 5099 (ONSC) (QL) at
paras 72-73; R v Korbut, 2012 ONCJ 522 at para 25.
101
In PJJE, supra note 71 at para 37, the judge explicitly recognized the fineness of the distinction: "It may be more
accurate to say that the Accused's conduct caused her a great deal of stress and it may be splitting hairs to say that it
was stress rather than fear that she was feeling."
98

24

“tormented, troubled, worried continually or chronically, plagued, bedevilled and badgered”.102
In several cases, the complainant was found to be annoyed and stressed, but not sufficiently
annoyed and stressed.103 In one such example, the accused sent sexually explicit photographs of
the complainant to her employer and several other people, while the complainant went on
disability leave from work, took prescription medication and received counselling. The Court,
relying on the test for psychological safety above, concluded that the impact on her was vexing
and annoying, but not disturbing enough.104 In other cases, the issue of psychological safety is
not expressly considered and criminal harassment charges are rejected because there were no
threats of violence or physical harm to the complainant.105
The burden of proof is of course on the Crown to establish, through the complainant, both
the fear and its reasonableness. There is no inquiry into the reasonableness of the accused’s
harassing actions. Judges interrogate how the complainant responded to the harassment: did she
take steps to avoid the accused,106 did she alter her life so as to prevent the possibility of
harassment,107 did she avoid taking any actions that might be interpreted as inconsistent with
fear;108 did she communicate to him the fact that his conduct was harassing,109 did she complain
to the police promptly enough,110 did she seek a restraining order,111 and was the harassment

102

See e.g.: R v Greenberg, 2010 ONSC 3584 at para 101 [Greenberg].
See e.g.: R v Hassan, [2009 OJ] No 1378, 2009 CanLII 15447 (ONSC) [Hassan]; R v Gibb, [2005] OJ No 3057
(ONCJ) (QL) [Gibb]; JW, supra note 77.
104
See e.g.: Hassan, supra note 103, where the trial judge applied this test and found that the threat to distribute
sexually explicit photos of the complainant was vexing and annoying but did not meet the standard required by s.
264.
105
See e.g.: PJJE, supra note 71; Russo, supra note 71; Seaton, supra note 71; MacLean, supra note 71.
106
Moyse, supra note 77 at para 85; Gilmar, supra note 77 at para 42.
107
Moyse, supra note 77 at para 87.
108
R v Monahan, 2010 SKPC 46 at para 77 [Monahan].
109
Frohlich, supra note 77 at para 56; Moyse, supra note 77 at paras 85, 91; Benoit, supra note 77 at para 11;
Seaton, supra note 71 at para 87.
110
Chancellor, supra note 72 at paras 77, 85. See also R v Wease, [2008] OJ no 1938 (ONSC) (QL) [Wease] where
the complainant's fear was doubted because she did not seek a restraining order even though she did contact police.
The fact that some women may not report criminal harassment immediately to police, and the tendency of courts to
103

25

objectively “bad enough” to allow us to label her fear as reasonable and the harassment as
criminal?112 As in sexual assault law, judges are assessing women’s response to a highly
traumatic series of events and determining whether that response is adequate for
acknowledgement by the criminal justice system. Judges make assumptions about how one
should respond to what may have been a persistent ongoing course of harassment by someone
with whom the complainant may share children and a long history. For example, the fact that a
woman does not contact police immediately may be used to discredit her allegations even though
there may be numerous reasons for trying to resolve problems with a former intimate partner
without immediate police involvement.113 Some women expressed the concern, for example,
that if they contacted the police the accused’s behaviour would escalate.114
In the present study, there were 57 acquittals in the 193 intimate partner cases involving
male accused. Of the 57 acquittals, more than half (33 cases) were based on some aspect of the
use that fact to cast doubt on her fear, can be analogized to the recent complaint doctrine that has plagued sexual
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complainant’s fear being inadequate: the complainant was not afraid, her fear was not reasonable
or both.115 In an earlier study of the criminal harassment provisions, Grant et al. found that
courts were likely to conclude that a woman was subjectively afraid.116 Thus in the current study
I expected that, in most cases where repeated harassment was found, the subjective fear
component would be found to be satisfied and the question would then be whether the fear was
reasonable. To the contrary, the current study found that the subjective component of the fear
creates more problems for complainants than the reasonableness requirement. In 21 intimate
partner cases the court concluded that the complainant was not subjectively afraid for her
safety,117 and in 15 cases fear was labeled unreasonable,118 the latter finding often made without
analysis following a finding of no subjective fear.119 Women asserted fear in these cases but were
disbelieved.
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i) The Subjective Component: She Wasn’t Afraid
The complainant’s behaviour is a significant factor in the judicial analysis of whether she
felt sufficiently fearful. In several cases, the judge’s conclusion that the complainant had not
subjectively feared was based, at least in part, on finding that her conduct was inconsistent with
what was expected of a fearful woman. For example, in R v Monahan, the complainant testified
as to her fear because the accused was following her.120 She testified that she sometimes drove
by the accused’s house to look for his vehicle so that she would not have to check for his vehicle
hiding somewhere on her way home. She indicated that she did this on the suggestion of the
police.121 The judge disbelieved her testimony about her fear, finding that “if she had truly
feared for her safety it is difficult to imagine why she would follow [the accused] from time to
time as she did. These actions are not consistent with someone experiencing fear”.122 Here the
judge assumes that there is one standard fear response and departures from that standard will be
fatal to successful prosecution, which ignores the sense of loss of control that women who are
repeatedly harassed often experience. Knowing where his car was could help reestablish some
sense of control over a situation which feels uncontrollable –what Stark refers to as “control in
the context of no control”123.
In R v JW, similar reasoning was used to find that the complainant did not subjectively
fear the accused.124 The complainant, only about 13 years old at the time of the offence, was the
accused’s ex-girlfriend. The accused, who was 16, could not accept the end of the relationship.
She alleged that he threatened to kill her new boyfriend, continued to follow her home from
school and to call her house, and attempted to put his hands down her pants. The accused was
120
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convicted of assault and uttering death threats but acquitted of criminal harassment. Kenkel J.
accepted that the accused repeatedly contacted the complainant and that, on one occasion, he
refused to leave her home when asked.125 However, much was made of the fact that the
complainant met with the accused twice during the period when he continued to pursue her thus
giving the judge a reasonable doubt about her fear.126 The judge described the teenaged
complainant as follows: “While she plainly found the accused annoying at times and was fearful
as a result of some of his statements, she continued to seek him out, perhaps enjoying the intense
attention even if it was the wrong kind of attention.”127 Reminiscent of the persistent mythology
in sexual assault that women invite and secretly desire sexual violence,128 the judge accepted that
she was fearful but then negated that fear because of her behaviour. It is simply not possible to
demonstrate how a 13-year-old girl “should” demonstrate fear as a result of harassment, death
threats to her new boyfriend and other related behaviours from the accused.
In R v Moyse,129 the judge found that the complainant was not afraid in part because she
continued contact with the accused but also because the accused used getting his property back
as an excuse to contact her. The judge reasoned that the complainant could have returned the
property if she was fearful of him as a way to reduce legitimate contact.130 The judge suggested

125

Ibid at paras 6, 28.
Ibid at paras 24-25.
127
Ibid at para 30. See also Gilmar, supra note 77, where no fear was found because the complainant continued to
have contact with the accused. See also Russo, supra note 71.
128
See e.g.: Randall, “Ideal Victims”, supra note 48 at 420.
129
Moyse, supra note 77.
130
Ibid at para 91. The complainant’s reaction was also found wanting in MacLean, supra note 71. In that case, the
accused repeatedly called his ex-wife, allegedly for the purpose of speaking to his sons, but often leaving hateful
messages on her voicemail. The complainant testified that she was afraid for her safety, believing that “the
defendant was unstable and that something would happen.” She spent the night at a friend’s home out of fear after
she went to the police. The judge rejected her testimony as to her fear because “her sworn statement to vary the
custody order, made only days before she went to the police, does not expressly assert this” and because the judge
disagreed with her that one of the calls that she found disturbing contained a sexual innuendo. Although the judge
was satisfied that the complainant was “psychologically disturbed” and “emotionally distress[ed]”, he was not
convinced that she feared for her physical safety.	
  
126

29

that “[t]his is inconsistent and unexplained behaviour of someone who is fearful”.131 He also
stated that if there had been genuine fear for her safety, she would have organized her life to
ensure no contact with the accused.132 The ongoing contact problem is a common theme in these
cases. While many women do organize their lives around avoiding their harassers, this should
not be a de facto element of the offence. Judges do not understand why a woman would have
contact with someone she feared. There is no recognition that she might think she could resolve
the situation through talking to the accused, that fear can coexist with other feelings towards the
accused, or that fear of a former intimate partner may manifest itself differently than fear of a
stranger.
Sometimes trial judges rely on an absence of violence to reject the notion that the
complainant was subjectively afraid for her safety even though courts have repeatedly
acknowledged that fear for one’s psychological safety is sufficient under s. 264. In R v Russo,133
the accused had sexually groomed and sexually exploited the complainant beginning when she
was about 14 years old and he was 59 years old. The complainant had a history of sexual abuse
from a number of men and was living in poverty when she met the accused. The accused stayed
in her life even after she married and had children. She eventually brought charges of criminal
harassment when he refused to leave her family alone. The trial judge acquitted the accused of
criminal harassment and a number of other charges, unconvinced that the complainant had feared
for her safety. Although she had testified that she was afraid, the judge found that the accused
had never behaved violently towards the complainant or her family. The judge used this
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conclusion, as well as the fact that the complainant felt some sympathy towards the accused, to
reject the complainant’s evidence that she was afraid of him.134
A complainant’s failure to seek a restraining order is also considered in deciding whether
she was truly afraid. In R v Wease,135 a complainant’s fear was doubted because she did not seek
a restraining order against her husband even though she did go to police to complain about his
behaviour. The accused and the complainant were involved in divorce proceedings. He was
convicted of criminal harassment at trial after following her and taking pictures of her vehicle.
The conviction was overturned on summary appeal, with the court stating that: “There is no
explanation given as to why, if the complainant was fearful and concerned as to her own
emotional or physical well-being, she did not pursue a restraining order in the Family Court
proceedings”.136 In Ross,137 the accused was acquitted of criminal harassment on the basis that
evidence of her fear was equivocal. This conclusion was based, in part, on the fact that it took
her a significant period of time before she sought a restraining order; roughly 2 weeks after the
accused had assaulted her. The onus was clearly placed on the complainant in these cases to take
the initiative to stop the harassment. The underlying (false) assumption is that restraining orders
put an end to the accused’s harassing behaviour.
As one might expect, where the complainant does take steps to act like the responsible
victim, courts are more likely to find she was afraid. For example, in R v Fader,138 the court
explicitly acknowledged that the complainant took steps to secure her safety and communicate to
134
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the accused that the relationship was over.139 In R v Malakpour,140 the fact that the complainant
avoided going out, avoided making friends and purchased a condominium because of its
increased security all contributed to the finding of subjective fear.
In a number of cases the judge stated that the complainant was afraid but that the fear did
not necessarily relate to her psychological or physical safety. In other words, she had the wrong
type of fear. For example, in R v Gibb,141 during the divorce proceedings of the accused and the
complainant, the accused was repeatedly holding demonstrations with others about the state of
family law in a park adjacent to the home of the complainant. On several occasions, anywhere
from 6-10 protesters were dressed as judges, carrying signs and protesting. One of them carried
a sign saying “judges kill families.”142 The accused also carried a sign with the names of his
children on it and his assertion that he loved them. The complainant changed her route to and
from home and avoided going to the park for walks or bike rides. Although the judge found that
there was some evidence as to the complainant’s fear, including her use of the words “scary” and
“nervous”, her installation of an alarm system in her home, and her being upset and crying when
the police attended at her home, the judge concluded that she “never articulated expressly that
she was in fear for her safety or the safety of her children”.143
In a particularly problematic decision, R v Lincoln,144 the accused left five insulting and
threatening phone messages for his ex-girlfriend. He threatened to go to her workplace and
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contact her family members because she had not returned a ring he had given her. His final
message to her stated:
I’m going to show you what kind of person I can be. You messed around with the
wrong person… You have no idea what I am capable of doing. And you are going to
start seeing slowly but surely I am going to affect you in every single way there is in
life. You can run away but I can find you. You can move to Jerusalem but I can still
find you. That’s what I do as a living. And I will find you. So, I will give you the best
advice. Give (sic) my ring. That’s the only advice I have for you. And very shortly I
will be finding your Mom, where they live. And nobody can stop me. Have a good
day. Rest in peace.145
The complainant testified that “rest in peace” in her mind referred to death.146 Despite these notso-subtle threats of serious harm, the trial judge concluded that the complainant was not
subjectively fearful. The judge held that if the complainant had feared, her fear would have been
reasonable, and found that the complainant “felt threatened by the messages” and that they
“made her feel sick”147, but concluded that she had not explicitly said that the “threat was to her
safety, as opposed to her financial well-being” and therefore dismissed the charges.148 It is not
clear how this last threat quoted above could be interpreted as a financial threat particularly with
the ominous “rest in peace” closing the message.

ii) The Objective Component: Her Fear Wasn’t Reasonable
As outlined earlier, even where the accused repeatedly harassed the complainant, causing
her fear, and knowing that he is harassing her, he will still be acquitted if the judge decides her
fear was not reasonable. As mentioned above, in the present sample, more acquittals resulted
from the judge finding that the complainant did not fear for her safety than from findings that her
145
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fear was not reasonable. The reasonableness requirement receives less scrutiny in the cases than
was expected. However, there is significant overlap between the assessment of whether the
complainant was afraid (which will be influenced by whether fear would be reasonable in the
circumstances) and whether that fear is assessed as reasonable.
For example, in R v PJJE,149 after the divorce of the accused and the complainant, the
accused entered their formerly shared home, which at the time was by court order exclusively
possessed by the complainant, to recover some property to which he felt he was entitled. As a
result, he was placed under a s. 810 peace bond, which forbade any contact, except through a
third party for the purpose of arranging access to the children. He continued to contact the
complainant, having numerous letters delivered to her house or taped on her door. In other
incidents, he followed her or showed up at places she was attending to seek access to the
children. The trial judge characterized the accused’s repeated harassment as merely the “zealous
pursuit of what is perceived to be his parental rights”, and found that his conduct could “fairly be
classified as threatening only in the sense of someone threatening to enforce a legal right”.150 The
trial judge characterized the accused’s conduct as merely the accused’s attempt to “check up on
the complainant from time to time”151 despite the fact that he was under a court order not to
contact her. The accused had never threatened violence although there were allegations of
violence before the marriage broke down.152 “His threats [were] of prospective outcomes in court
rather than physical harm.”153 Skilnick J. accepted that the complainant felt harassed and afraid
and that the accused knew or ought to have known that his constant communication was
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harassment or at least that he was wilfully blind about whether the complainant was harassed.154
However, the judge was left in doubt as to whether her fear for her safety or that of her children
was reasonable, commenting:
In saying this, I do not minimize the feelings of frustration that the Complainant has as a
result of the bitterness and bad feelings from her matrimonial court battles with the
Accused. The difficulty I have in finding criminal liability in these circumstances stems
from the fact that all of the harassing behaviour is rooted in the matrimonial issues. The
“threats” are of legal consequences, not of expressed or implied threats of violence or
other affronts to the safety of the Complainant or of her children.155
Skilnick J. noted that while some matrimonial disputes may escalate into criminal harassment,
“the conduct of the Accused in this case leaves me in doubt as to whether that stage has been
reached”, given that he never threatened the complainant, even in a veiled manner. Her fear was
unreasonable because it was based on past not future violence:
His behaviour may have generated fear in the Complainant. However that fear seems
to be based on a concern that past behaviour might repeat itself. The communications in
and of themselves can not reasonably be construed as threatening of anything other than
legal action. I can not find beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct is such as to
reasonably cause the complainant to fear for her safety.156
The trial judge was dismissive of the fear he found the complainant had, indicating that while the
accused was not “a living example of the prayer of St. Francis”, her fear was unreasonable.157
In R v Benedict,158 the accused had courted the complainant in anticipation of an arranged
marriage according to their culture. She exercised her right to refuse the marriage according to
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custom and told him she did not want to see him anymore, but agreed to meet him on one further
occasion after breaking off the relationship. He frequently phoned her and waited in his car
outside her workplace. The accused was cautioned more than once by the police and was subject
to a restraining order with respect to the complainant. He had also apparently spent time in
custody for prior harassing conduct against the complainant although it appears that no charges
were ever proceeded with at the time.
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The trial judge accepted all of the complainant’s

evidence as credible and rejected the evidence of the accused as incredible and unreliable.160
Nonetheless he concluded, without any real explanation, that the complainant’s fear was not
reasonable:
I accept that [the complainant] was made nervous and upset by Mr. Benedict’s
appearance outside her home. Her privacy and sense of peace had been disturbed once
again by the accused’s pitiable conduct. However, given the chronology and context of
events since May 2001, while I consider it probable and while I accept that the
experience for her was quite unsettling, I am not satisfied on all the evidence to the
requisite standard that the complainant feared for her safety on an objective standard of
reasonableness. In this regard, the prosecution has failed to prove one of the essential
elements of criminal harassment.161
Yet the judge clearly had some concern for the safety of the complainant given that he ordered
the accused not to have any contact or communication with the complainant or any member of
her family.
In three of the four cases where acquittals were based entirely on the grounds of
unreasonableness (i.e.: where subjective fear was not doubted), the accused was subject to a
restraining order to stay away from the complainant.162 This finding is difficult to explain
because one would expect that the presence of a restraining order would give judges more
159
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support for the complainant’s fear and the reasonableness thereof. The restraining order was
presumably obtained for a reason and, the fact that an accused is willing to ignore a court order
demonstrates his willingness to step outside the bounds of the law to engage in harassment. One
would expect resultant fear would be considered reasonable. In the overall sample, the presence
of a restraining order made conviction more likely, as one would expect. It is possible that
police are more likely to lay charges of criminal harassment sooner where there is a restraining
order and thus the behaviour may not have escalated as far, although the ongoing harassment in
Benedict, in particular, was quite significant. The high conviction rate overall, where restraining
orders are in place, belies this possibility.163 These three cases represent such a small number that
no real conclusions can be drawn from the fact that fear was found to be unreasonable in the face
of a restraining order. However the fact that women’s fear is considered unreasonable when the
harassment takes place in the context of a restraining order creates a bind for women: if she does
not get a restraining order she was not sufficiently afraid, yet if she does her fear may still be
labelled as unreasonable. Why should women seek restraining orders if their violation does not
render the fear they experience reasonable?
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A finding that a woman’s fear is unreasonable, where the other elements of the offence
are established, is highly problematic in light of the evidence that women are particularly attuned
to the cues of abusive intimate male partners. This has been widely recognized in the context of
intimate partner violence164 and there is no reason to suspect otherwise in the context of criminal
harassment. It is very likely that the complainant is in a better position to assess whether to take
seriously the harassing activities of her former intimate partner than are judges and juries.
As with the cases on subjective fear, the complainant who has taken steps to avoid the
harassment is more likely to have her fear labelled as reasonable.165 In R v Lauzon,166 for
example, in deciding whether the complainant’s fear was reasonable, the judge noted that she
had had to change her phone number to avoid the accused, she limited the places she went to in
town to avoid him, and that she knew he would be waiting for her when she left work. “It seems
to me clearly in that context it was reasonable for her to feel as she did that she was fearful of
Mr. Lauzon”.167
As mentioned, there is a significant overlap between a finding that a woman was not
afraid and that her fear was unreasonable. The former finding implies that a woman was not
believed in her assertions of fear, usually because she failed to take adequate steps to avoid the
harassment or because her fear was not manifest in the manner we expect women to demonstrate
fear. Finding that her fear was not reasonable implies that, while we may believe she was afraid,
that fear was exaggerated or illegitimate (or even hysterical). Both findings are premised on
assumptions driven by how we expect women to respond to and express fear. It is important not
164
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to overstate the differences between an acquittal based on no fear and an acquittal based on
unreasonable fear. In the actual cases, the reasonableness requirement often plays a role in the
subjective determination of fear. In other words, courts may disbelieve her actual fear precisely
because it is not consistent with expectations of how a reasonable woman would behave in the
circumstances. For example, if the complainant fails to make clear that she wants the harassment
to stop that may be “taken to be acting inconsistently with her assertion of fear” or taken as
“condoning his continued attentions”, which can in turn be taken to “remove the objective basis
for fear”.168 In other words, both subjective fear and its reasonableness can be negated by
evidence that the complainant failed to behave like the “responsible victim”.
I am not suggesting that none of the acquittals in the above decisions were justified. Nor
am I suggesting that women should not take steps to avoid criminal harassment by former
intimate partners as most of them choose to do. Rather, I would argue that taking such steps
should not be a necessary prerequisite to criminal prosecution of their harassers. Clearly, fear is
not the only response to harassment, yet it is the only response that section 264 acknowledges as
legitimate. Judging women for continuing to have contact with their harassers fails to
acknowledge the complex emotions that can result from being victimized by one’s former
intimate partner. Requiring the complainant to radically change her life or to take steps to make
sure the harassment was minimized shifts the focus onto her behaviour and away from the
behaviour of the accused in a way that is reminiscent of the sexual assault context.169 Such
responsibilization also shifts attention away from the failure of the legal system to enforce no
contact orders, and away from the state’s obligation to protect women from harassing behaviour.
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The problem lies both in the legislation, which requires reasonable fear, and in the judicial
interpretation thereof.
2. Mens rea: Did the Accused Know That His Conduct Was Harassing
The fault requirement for criminal harassment has been described as “one of the most
controversial elements of the crime” and has been dealt with differently in different
jurisdictions.170 The mens rea for criminal harassment in s. 264 is whether the accused knew or
was reckless with respect to the fact that the complainant was harassed. This requirement has
been criticized for allowing the man who sees harassment as “romantic pursuit” of the
complainant to avoid conviction.171 Similarly, the man who calls or texts his former partner 200
times under the guise of resolving access to children will be acquitted if he does not even
consider whether that behaviour is harassing.172 In some cases the mens rea requirement has
been interpreted as a responsibility on women to communicate to the potential accused that she is
afraid or harassed.
This interpretation can be analogized to the early interpretation of non-consent in the
sexual assault context. Early case law put the responsibility on women to communicate a “no”
on the issue of consent and only more recently have the courts come to an understanding of
affirmative consent that requires a communication of consent (not of non-consent).173 In
criminal harassment, the wording of section 264 and its judicial interpretation creates an ongoing
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requirement that a woman communicate to the accused that she is being harassed. In other
words, harassing male pursuit of women which causes fear is acceptable unless she
communicates otherwise to him. Sometimes contacting the police or seeking a restraining order
will be sufficient to demonstrate one’s harassment,174 but as the data in the sample demonstrates,
the existence of a no contact order does not make conviction inevitable. The sample did not
contain many intimate partner cases where the male accused was acquitted because he lacked the
mens rea for criminal harassment. This is in part because mens rea is usually the last element
considered: the trial judge does not even consider mens rea if there is a reasonable doubt about
the complainant’s lack of fear or its reasonableness, both of which are part of the actus reus.
There is also an overlap between mens rea and reasonable fear such that a finding of
mens rea is less likely where the judge has concluded there is no reasonable fear. The steps the
complainant takes to avoid the accused, and what she communicates to him, will be critical for
both elements. The following is taken from R v Mustaka and demonstrates the overlap between
the elements of criminal harassment:
These cases appear to often boil down to a question of degree. In Ryback, above, Finch
J.A. looked to whether the complainant had made her rejection of the accused known to
him, such that he must have been taken to be reckless as to the effect of his attention on
her. It seems the issue of communication may be relevant to both mens rea and the
reasonableness of the complainant’s assertion of fear. Arguably, some level of
persistent behaviour may occur in a dating context or in the course of a relationship
breakup and not be either objectively frightening or indicative of recklessness.
However, one would also expect that there is an onus on the accused to ensure that a
complainant welcomes his attentions, rather than adopting a course of wilful blindness
where there is no active encouragement. See: R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
… [A] complainant who fails to rebuff unwanted entreaties may in some circumstances
be taken to be acting inconsistently with her assertion of fear. That is essentially the
argument here, that the complainant had not made it plain enough to Mr. Mustaka that
the relationship was over, essentially that she was allowing or condoning his continued
174
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attentions, which can either be taken to remove the objective basis for fear on the part of
the complainant or, presumably, to negate recklessness on the part of the accused.175
As we have seen so often with sexual assault, the onus is put on the complainant to demonstrate
that his harassing behaviour was unwanted. The judge went on to hold that there is a higher onus
on the Crown when dealing with former intimate partners to establish that the accused’s
behaviour in pursuing a reconciliation crossed the line into criminal conduct unless the accused's
conduct is “inherently offensive or obviously uninvited”.176 In other words, after being in an
intimate relationship, you are expected to tolerate a certain amount of harassment. This is
particularly problematic for women leaving abusive relationships.
In the six cases where the accused was acquitted on this basis,177 it was common to see
the rationale being that the complainant had failed in her efforts to inform the accused that his
behaviour was harassing; the accused was not expected to figure that out for himself. In R v
Benjamin,178 the accused was convicted at trial but that conviction was overturned on summary
conviction appeal. The judgment is a bit unclear as to which element of the offence led to the
acquittal. However, the court made a number of relevant statements regarding mens rea and
regarding the complainant’s failure to communicate that she was harassed. For example, the
Court stated:
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In her telephone conversation, Ms. D did not say that he frightened her or that he
intimidated her or that she was threatened by him. She did not warn him that there
would be consequences should they encounter each other again.179
The fact that complainant had initiated a phone call with the accused, even though the purpose of
the call was to make clear that she did not want to see him again, was held against her even
though the accused knew that the complainant wanted nothing to do with him:
That Mr. Benjamin was obsessed and knew that Ms. D did not want to have anything to
do with him does not mean that he knew that she was afraid or intimidated by his
presence. It does not mean his conduct was designed to invoke the fear of an invasion of
Ms. D’s privacy. She never told him that he frightened her in their three-hour telephone
phone call, which was their last direct contact before May 27, 2008. Her conduct in that
telephone call, which she initiated, if anything, revealed her strength and her resolve not
to be overborne by his desire to reconcile.180
In R v Wease,181 the accused was initially convicted of criminal harassment on the basis
of wilful blindness. The accused had admitted he didn’t care what impact his actions had on the
complainant and the trial judge found this was adequate to constitute wilful blindness. On
appeal, however, the judicial focus was on the fact that the complainant had not sought a
restraining order against the accused nor communicated the fact that she was afraid.
I cannot agree that the accused engaged in such conduct that he knew harassed the
complainant nor was he reckless or wilfully blind as to whether the complainant was
harassed. In this case, the appellant received no warning that his conduct was
considered harassment by the complainant; nor was this communicated to the appellant
through the complainant’s lawyer or through the police. There was no outstanding
restraining order…There is no explanation given as to why, if the complainant was
fearful and concerned as to her own emotional or physical well-being, she did not
pursue a restraining order in the Family Court proceedings. 182
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Similarly in R v Ross,183 a summary conviction appeal was allowed on the basis that the
accused did not have the requisite mens rea. The accused suffered from mental health issues
following an accident and had become aggressive and was behaving unpredictably towards his
wife. Although the complainant considered herself to be separated from the accused, the
appellate court found that she may not have effectively communicated the separation to him even
though they were living in separate homes and she had started discussing divorce with him. She
testified that she did not tell him that his behaviour was harassing because she was afraid it
would escalate his conduct. The trial judge had clearly found that the accused knew his
behaviour was harassing, given that the accused made repeated angry telephone calls to the
complainant and made regular disruptive visits to the complainant’s home and workplace. The
summary conviction appeal court disagreed finding that she should have told him that she was
afraid and that he should stop communicating with her. The Court also noted that there was
never any police intervention telling the accused to stay away from the complainant even though
the complainant had in fact called the police. The Court indicated that she had never followed up
with an application for a restraining order nor was it clear that the police had actually spoken
with the accused and warned him not to contact the complainant.184 There may be a number of
reasons why a woman would not want to communicate her fear to her former intimate partner.
For example, a communication of fear could make the complainant feel more vulnerable to the
accused and could encourage the accused to persist in his behaviour. In essence, a
communication of fear could demonstrate that the accused has been successful in his attempts to
harass the complainant thus giving the accused even more power over her. The complainant may
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feel she needs to retain some sense of control of the situation and not to reveal to the accused just
how fearful she is.185
The mens rea cases also demonstrate similar concerns to those of the subjective fear
cases – if the complainant initiates contact, for example, it is more likely that the accused will be
found not to have the mens rea. Paradoxically, she is expected to communicate the fact that she
is harassed and yet not to communicate with the accused. In R v Frohlich, the Court found that
the complainant was “equivocal” because she had contacted the accused twice during the
relevant time period, even though one of those contacts was to insist that he have no further
contact with her.186 Similarly, in R v Seaton, the Court held that the complainant’s failure to
inform the accused that she had a new boyfriend and to tell him to stop calling her suggested that
he did not know he was harassing her by continuing to attempt to reestablish their relationship.187
In R v Menkarios,188 the accused was convicted at trial of assaulting his former girlfriend
twice, however he was acquitted of criminal harassment because the complainant apparently
unconsciously invited the harassment. The summary conviction appeal court summed up the
trial judge’s reasons for acquitting the accused of criminal harassment as follows:
The trial judge stated that he acquitted the accused on the harassment charge because he
was left wondering “whether in some unconscious sort of way [the complainant] may
not have inadvertently invited that or in an attitude of appeasement just to let it pass and
there may have been a note of encouragement”.189
It is not entirely clear from the trial decision to what element of criminal harassment this
“unconscious” invitation to be harassed relates although the appellate judgment seems to suggest
185
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it relates to both the complainant’s fear and the accused’s intent. The appellate court noted that
the trial judge’s observation was purely speculative and that nothing in the evidence supported
this conclusion. The trial judge had also indicated that the complainant had a tendency to look
back at the history of their relationship and “to attribute great importance to minor hurts and
peccadilloes,”190 a puzzling finding given that that history included two assaults prior to the
course of harassment in question. There was strong evidence of ongoing harassment and it was
clear the accused had been warned by the police to stop contacting the complainant. This type of
judicial pronouncement – that a woman unconsciously invited male violence against her – would
no longer be considered acceptable in the sexual assault context and should not be acceptable in
criminal harassment. These mens rea cases demonstrate the problem with putting the
responsibility on the complainant to alert the accused to the fact that his behaviour is harassing.
A subjective mens rea standard may be particularly inappropriate for criminal harassment given
that the accused men in these cases seem able to detach themselves from the reality of their
actions and to retain the belief that they are engaged in legitimate pursuit of their former partner
or of access to children or property. The accused essentially gets a free pass with his harassing
behaviour until the complainant has communicated her distress to him. As such, the accused
who believes he is entitled to ongoing access to the complainant, or the accused who never
bothers to think about how the complainant is perceiving his behaviour, is entitled to be
acquitted.
Canada is not unique in struggling to find an appropriate balance between the need to
recognize the harm to women from criminal harassment and the need to avoid over
criminalization. Even though criminal harassment is a relatively new crime in most jurisdictions,
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several countries have reassessed their new legislation in light of the types of frailties identified
in this paper. The following section presents a brief summary of how other jurisdictions have
responded to the challenges in drafting criminal harassment legislation with a view to identifying
options for reform in the Canadian context.
LESSONS FROM ABROAD
The 1990s saw a flurry of legislative action in the area of criminal harassment. In many
jurisdictions, like Canada, the legislation was triggered by outrage over cases where women had
been murdered after being criminally harassed, usually by a former intimate partner.191
California passed the first anti-stalking law in the United States in 1990 and every other state
followed suit.192 Every Australian jurisdiction enacted legislation between 1993 and 1996 with
several jurisdictions undergoing major revisions of this legislation only a few years after its
enactment in response to criticism concerning gaps in the initial legislation.193 New Zealand
passed criminal harassment laws in 1997.194 Very few of these jurisdictions require both a high
level of intention and a particular response on the part of the complainant (as in Canada); most
focus on one element or the other.195
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England has recently moved away from a rigid focus on fear of violence. In 1997,
England enacted two provisions in the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. These provisions
were reportedly enacted hastily without a lot of thought by a government wanting to appear to be
responding to crime before an election.196 Section 2 of the Act is the equivalent of a summary
conviction offence which involves harassment leading to alarm or distress and is punishable by a
maximum six months. Section 4A creates a more serious offence where the conduct leads to a
fear of violence on the part of the complainant and is subject to a maximum punishment of five
years. More recently, in 2012, England enacted a new provision through amendments to the
Protection from Harassment Act 1997.197 The 2012 amendments were in response to a
government report demonstrating that existing laws against harassment were inadequate in many
respects.198 Concerns were raised that many cases were too serious for the lesser offence but
could not meet the threshold of fear of violence required by the more serious offence. The fear
of violence provision set too high a threshold and one which failed to recognize the impact of
harassment even where there is no explicit fear of violence.199 The new s. 4A(1)(b)(ii) adds a
third offence where the accused engages in a course of conduct which causes the victim “serious
There is no requirement that he intend to cause her fear. The approach to the complainant’s response is an objective
test only with no subjective test of what the complainant was actually experiencing. The question is whether
“reasonably in the circumstances” a person would apprehend or fear violence to themselves, others or to property or
whether they would experience a “detriment”. Detriment is defined broadly and includes serious mental,
psychological or emotional harm and also includes an impact on the person’s day-to-day behaviours such as
changing one’s route or form of transport to work or other places (see Criminal Code (Stalking) Amendments Act
1999 (Qld)). Each jurisdiction in Australia has a different combination of elements with some focusing more on the
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alarm or distress which has a substantial adverse effect on the victim’s usual day-to-day
activities” and where the defendant “knew, or ought to have known” that his conduct would have
this effect. This offence is punishable by a maximum five years imprisonment.
While this English provision could be criticized for focusing on the reaction of the
complainant, it has several advantages over s. 264. First, it recognizes that harassment can have a
profound negative impact on a person’s day-to-day life without necessarily causing them fear.
Never knowing when the harasser is going to appear, incessant contact through social media,
changing one’s day-to-day life to avoid contact with the accused, the lack of control over one’s
life that results from ongoing harassment could all be recognized under this provision. The Home
Office guidelines on the new law suggest that indicators of substantial adverse effect on the usual
day-to-day activities could include:
•

the victim changing their routes to work, work patterns, or employment;

•

the victim arranging for friends or family to pick up children from school (to avoid
contact with the stalker);

•

the victim putting in place additional security measures in their home;

•

the victim moving home;

•

physical or mental ill health;

•

the victim’s deterioration in performance at work due to stress;

•

the victim stopping/or changing the way they socialize.200

Thus, the English approach does not define one reaction that alone is sufficient. A broad range
of possible reactions is acknowledged and the legislation does not purport to present an
exhaustive list of the types of harms acknowledged. Under Canadian legislation, in contrast, a
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deteriorating work performance or a change in socialization patterns would not pass the
threshold of reasonable fear.
Second, the complainant’s reaction is not subjected to a standard of reasonableness.
There does have to be a substantial adverse effect on her daily activities but that affect is
assessed subjectively. The English structure prioritizes the complainant’s actual response rather
than the response that is expected of her. English law holds the harasser to a standard of
reasonableness while Canadian law subjects the complainant’s reaction to a reasonableness
requirement. While there is no requirement that the complainant’s response be reasonable in the
English legislation, there is a defence for an accused whose course of conduct was reasonable for
his own protection or the protection of property.201
Third, the accused does not have to intend to harass the complainant. It is sufficient if a
reasonable person would know that his behaviour is harassing. The man who thinks he is
engaged in merely pursuing his former partner to win her affections or the man who believes he
is entitled to harass his former spouse in his “zealous pursuit” of access to his children would not
have a defence as he does under the Canadian legislation. While the judicial interpretation of this
provision remains to be seen, and specifically whether courts are assessing the adequacy of the
women’s response, the legislation is an example of a law reform effort that tries to address the
wide range of harms caused by criminal harassment in a manner that is responsive to the impact
of such behaviour on complainants.
CONCLUSION
This case law study demonstrates that, too often, the Canadian law on criminal
harassment puts women in the position where they must take responsibility for avoiding criminal
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harassment and for ensuring that the accused knows that his behaviour is harassing, rather than
putting the responsibility on the accused to assess his own behaviour and determine that repeated
phone calls or texts, watching, following, sending pictures to her workplace, etc. are harassing
behaviours.
Criminal harassment may emerge from a previously violent relationship, it may escalate
into physical violence, and in extreme cases, it can lead to femicide.202 However, it is important
to recognize that the potential for physical violence is not the only harm of criminal harassment.
The cumulative impact of a number of behaviours which, when considered in isolation, might
not individually warrant criminal liability, can have a devastating impact on a woman’s life.
These behaviours leave complainants with a sense of dread, loss of control and trauma which
builds over time and can have a significant impact on their mental and physical health.
Researchers have demonstrated in the context of intimate partner violence that it is not always
the actual physical violence that causes the most harm to women but rather the psychological
impact of the other controlling behaviours of the male partner.203 Focusing on individual
components of the harassment fails to acknowledge the totality of the ordeal experienced by the
victim of criminal harassment.204
Canadian legislation accordingly needs to be rethought with a view to removing the
obligation on women to establish that they have behaved like proper victims. Our experience
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with sexual assault teaches that there is no ideal victim, and no “correct” response to criminal
harassment. Putting requirements on women to respond in a particular way perpetuates
stereotypes about female victimization by intimate partners.205 In this respect, the recent English
legislation provides a useful example. Removing the focus on fear and removing the requirement
that that fear be reasonable would be a significant start. While it is impossible to remove the
impact on the complainant altogether from the definition of the offence (because, in some cases,
the behaviours of the accused are not otherwise criminal), it is important that no one response be
privileged over others. Women should not be told that there is only one appropriate response to
criminal harassment and that all others will be disregarded. The English legislation is instructive
in this regard; it requires a substantial adverse effect on the usual day-to-day activities of the
complainant thus acknowledging a range of responses to ongoing harassment. Canadian law
could integrate some form of a substantial adverse effect on day-to-day activities. Her response
to the harassment should not be subjected to a reasonableness inquiry as women are in a better
position to understand the cues of the harasser and the seriousness of the harassment. People
respond to trauma and abuse in different ways and the reasonableness requirement shifts the
responsibility onto women to be “responsible victims”. With respect to mens rea, an objective
standard of liability, such as that adopted in the new English provision, would require the
accused’s behaviour to be subjected to a standard of reasonableness. The accused who
reasonably believed that his behaviour was not harassing would still be acquitted but the accused
who unreasonably believed he was romantically pursuing the complainant or asserting rights
over property or children would no longer have a defence. In other words, we should shift the
risk that the accused’s harassing behaviour is unwanted onto him, not the complainant. More
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importantly, the requirement that the complainant communicate her fear to the accused could no
longer be imposed by judges if a standard of reasonableness were used to assess the accused’s
mental state. It should be sufficient if the harassing conduct takes place repeatedly, has a
significant adverse effect on the complainant, and the accused knows or ought to know that fact.
These changes would make a significant contribution to ensuring that the criminal justice system
recognizes the harm done to women from criminal harassment. Other jurisdictions, most notably
England, have taken steps to amend their legislation to address the seriousness of criminal
harassment. It is time for Canada to follow suit.
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